We examine how the ownership, analyst coverage and stock market valuation of a sample of U.S. firms vary with their environmental performance. Both "green" and "toxic" firms have a larger number of shareholders but a smaller percentage of institutional owners and ownership stakes relative to environmentally neutral firms. Nonetheless, toxic firms have higher institutional ownership than green firms. All institutional investor types except the category that includes universities, pension plans and employee stock ownership plans hold smaller fractions of green firms, while the latter institutional investor category is the only one to hold a lower percentage of toxic firms. Analyst coverage is higher for toxic firms, and green and toxic industries have the lowest and the highest analyst coverage, respectively. Both green and toxic firms have lower values of Tobin's Q than environmentally neutral firms.
The growing concern about environmental degradation and climate change has propelled an explosive growth in socially responsible investing (SRI) 1 and reinvigorated interest in corporate environmental performance. While the finance literature has recently paid considerable attention to the financial performance of SRI investments, 2 the important question of how green firms are received by stock market investors, which in turn could explain why some firms are greener than others, has not been fully explored. The purpose of this paper is to help fill this void in the finance literature by examining how environmental performance is related to the ownership structure, analyst coverage and stock market valuation of U.S. firms.
According to the Social Investment Forum, "SRI investors encourage corporations to improve their practices on environmental, social, and governance issues."
Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) develop a model to show that when green investors boycott polluting firms, thereby reducing the number of investors able to hold the stock of these firms, polluting firms are punished by an increase in their cost of capital due to the diminished risk sharing opportunities for their investors. Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) argue that being excluded from the portfolios of green investors may induce some polluting firms to voluntarily undertake reforms to stop polluting, when the cost of doing so is less than the capital cost disadvantage that they would otherwise have to bear. The impact of green investors on corporate behavior rises as the incremental cost of adopting 1 The Social Investment Forum (2007) estimates that $2.71 trillion or around 11 percent of assets under professional management in the U.S. meet the SRI criteria, which integrate environmental, social and governance factors into investment decisions. 2 See, for example, Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) , Statman (2000) , Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) , Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007) .
green technologies drops. Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner's (2001) theoretical analysis suggests that green firms will attract a larger investor following than polluting firms. Merton (1987) advances an incomplete information model in which the rate of return of a stock is inversely related to the number of investors who are informed about the firm, since the increase in the number of informed investors causes the stock to become more informationally complete. As noted by Merton (1987) , to the extent that green investors act as if they do not know anything about polluting firms, this lack of awareness could also cause the same increase in required rate of return that Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) predict. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) study "sin" stocks, which are the stocks of firms involved in gaming or in producing alcohol or tobacco, and find that these stocks have higher expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) provide evidence that environmental performance is negatively related to a firm's cost of equity capital.
However, in addition to reducing the required rate of return due to improved risk sharing caused by an influx of green investors, it is also possible that exclusionary green investing, by limiting green investors to a subset of stocks that meet their investment criteria, could cause stock prices to overshoot their fundamental value if the supply of acceptable green investment opportunities does not keep up with the demand from SRI investors. Consistent with this possibility, the Social Investment Forum (2007) documents that the growth of SRI assets has significantly outpaced the growth of the broader universe of all investment assets under professional management. There is weak empirical evidence pertaining to the notion that SRI assets may be overvalued even after controlling for the lower risk that they represent to investors, which suggests that SRI investors are willing to pay a premium for investing in financial assets that fulfill their environmental and social objectives (see Renneboog, ter Horst and Zhang (2008) for a comprehensive review). Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) estimate that investors who invest exclusively in SRI funds will incur an SRI constraint cost of at least 30 basis points a month if they believe in multi-factor pricing models and would have invested accordingly in the absence of the SRI constraint. 3 If there is a risk-adjusted market underperformance of green stocks due to these stocks being overvalued, we would expect to observe a migration of investors, especially better-informed institutional investors who are not restricted by an SRI constraint, out of green stocks. Alternatively or in addition, it is possible that if exclusionary ethical investing criteria do not exist uniformly across all investor categories, investors who are indifferent to green stocks will migrate out of these stocks, thereby making way for the influx of green investors.
We provide a comprehensive examination of how the ownership dispersion of firms varies with their environmental performance, i.e., the firms' degree of "greenness."
We measure environmental performance using the environmental performance measures from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc. (KLD) social performance dataset. KLD is a financial advisory firm that provides social screening of firms to clients via its reports and socially screened mutual funds, and their data is widely used in the literature to measure corporate social and environmental performance. 4 For each stock, KLD provides seven sub-indicators for environmental strengths and seven sub-indicators for environmental concerns. If the firm meets or exceeds the KLD threshold in each subindicator category, it is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. We use the total 3 Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) also provide evidence of an SRI premium for UK stocks. 4 See, for example, Graves and Waddock (1994) for further discussion of the KLD data.
number of environmental strengths and concerns reported in the KLD data to measure the environmental performance of the firms in our sample, which allows us to categorize firms into four groups: "green", "toxic", "gray" and "neutral." Green (toxic) firms have at least one environmental strength (concern) while having no environmental concerns (strengths). Gray firms have both environmental strengths and concerns, whereas neutral firms do not have either strengths or concerns. We further define green and toxic industries. Green (toxic) industries refers to industries with the percentage of green (toxic) firms greater than 10% while the percentage of toxic (green) firms within the industry is less than 10 percent. These classifications enable us to examine the effects of environmental performance variations between and within industries on ownership structure, analyst coverage, and stock market valuation and performance.
We find a non-monotonic relationship between environmental performance and ownership characteristics. Green firms have a larger number of shareholders compared to neutral firms, which is consistent with the prediction of Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) . Consistent with our conjecture that some investors may exit green stocks, we also find that aggregate institutional ownership is significantly negatively related to environmental performance, suggesting that "greenness" makes firms less attractive on average to institutional investors. Surprisingly, we find a similar pattern at the other end of the environmental performance spectrum, i.e., toxic firms also have a larger number of shareholders relative to neutral firms while having a smaller percentage of institutional investors and lower institutional ownership stakes. This finding suggests that total and individual (institutional) ownership is higher (lower) at both ends of the environmental performance spectrum. While there are significant size and age differences across the four broad environmental classifications we use in our analysis, the ownership differences persist when we control for size and age differences in our regression analysis. When we directly compare our green firm sub-sample with our toxic firm sub- While we find no significant difference in analyst coverage for green firms in our regression analysis, we find that analyst coverage is significantly higher for toxic firms and (especially) for gray firms, after controlling for size and age differences, and S&P 500 membership. To the extent there are parallels between sin stocks and toxic stocks, our finding for analyst coverage is the opposite of what Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find for sin stocks.
At the industry level, we find that the fraction of shares held by institutional investors in green industries is significantly smaller than for toxic industries. Similarly, green and toxic industries have the lowest and the highest analyst coverage, respectively, despite green industry firms being significantly more likely than neutral or toxic industry firms to be in the S&P 500. Furthermore, institutional investors hold significantly higher amounts of toxic firm stocks when these firms are in green industries.
We also find that both green and toxic firms are valued lower by the market than neutral firms, with Tobin's Q being lower by 5% and 8%, respectively, compared to neutral firms. While our finding for toxic firms is consistent with the prediction of Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) , the finding for green firms is the opposite of what they predict. While abnormal market-adjusted returns to both green and toxic firms relative to neutral firms are negative but statistically insignificant, we find that toxic firms in green industries significantly underperform both green and neutral firms, while there is not statistically significant difference in performance between green and neutral firms.
Due to the parallels noted by Merton (1987) between the case where green investors act as if they do not know anything about non-green firms and the case where investors do not invest in firms due to lack of awareness, our findings are also related to the study by Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) that examines how increasing a firm's visibility through advertising is related to breadth of ownership and liquidity. Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) find that firms with greater advertising expenses have higher numbers of both individual and institutional investors. To the extent that environmental performance increases a firm's visibility with investors or affects the investment decisions of individuals or institutions, it is interesting to draw parallels between our findings and the findings of Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) . While we find that individual investors respond similarly to advertising and environmental performance, institutions seem to respond in opposing directions to these two types of corporate expenditures.
The behavior of institutional investors towards corporate greenness is an enigma.
As we have argued, since institutional investors operate in a highly competitive fund management market, it is possible that they have no choice but to disregard all but the most explicit investment restrictions imposed on them by their clients. This argument, coupled with our finding that neither green nor toxic firms outperform the market, may explain why institutional investors seem to shy away from both green and toxic firms.
However, our finding that institutional investors prefer toxic stocks to green stocks is quite surprising, especially in the context of the evidence provided by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) that institutions shun sin stocks. The difference in our findings sheds some light on institutional investor perceptions of sin stocks versus toxic stocks. While sin stocks are clearly identifiable, a firm's greenness is a matter of degree. Therefore, while investing in sin stocks may trigger objections for a large number of institutional investors, investing in environmental underperformers is considerably less visible and will be problematic only for institutional investors who are subject to explicit SRI screens.
We discuss our data and methodology in the next section. Section II presents our empirical findings on the relation between environmental performance and ownership, analyst following and stock market valuation. Section III concludes.
I. Data and Methodology
We obtain our environmental performance measures from the Kinder, Lydenberg, We also find systematic differences in analyst coverage at the firm level. 85% of green firms, 90% of toxic firms and 76% of neutral firms are followed by analysts. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. There is no systematic difference in corporate governance across the sub-samples. Both green and toxic firms have higher GIM indices than neutral firms, indicating poor governance, while they also have higher likelihoods of independent boards relative to neutral firms. In addition, toxic firms have lower CEO/Chairman duality suggesting that managers of toxic firms are less likely to be entrenched. Collectively, the conflicting findings on corporate governance suggest that the differences generated by green and toxic firms are less likely to be driven by variations in corporate governance.
Next, we examine the variation within green industries in Panel C. The number of shareholders continues to be higher for green and toxic firms, while green firms continue to attract a lower number of institutional investors. While the ratio of shares held by institutional investors in green firms is lower relative to that of neutral firms, it is higher for toxic firms. This finding suggests a tendency for some institutional investors to invest selectively in toxic firms when these firms are categorized in green industries.
Finally, we examine the effect of green and toxic firms in toxic industries. We continue to find a higher number of investors and a lower ratio of institutional investors investing in green and toxic firms. Furthermore, the ratio of institutional holdings is lower in green and toxic firms relative to neutral firms. Toxic and green firms have more analysts and are more likely to have analyst coverage than neutral firms. However, the differences in institutional holdings and analyst coverage between green and toxic firms are not statistically significant. The findings in the sub-sample of toxic industries are similar to those found in the whole sample.
It is also important to note differences generated by gray firms, which have both green and toxic firm characteristics. The ownership pattern of gray firms is similar to that of green and toxic firms. Gray firms have a higher number of shareholders, lower number of institutional investors, lower ratios of shares held by institutional investors and higher analyst coverage. Furthermore, gray firms attain the largest (or lowest) values in each variable of interest, indicating that they represent the cumulative effect of green and toxic firms. This finding continues to hold in sub-samples of green and toxic industries. Similar to green and toxic firms, gray firms have a higher likelihood of independent boards and higher GIM indices on average relative to neutral firms.
Table 2 also reports that green and toxic firms as well as green and toxic industries show distinct differences in firm characteristics. For example, green and toxic firms are larger relative to neutral firms while green industries tend to have smaller firms relative those in neutral industries. We control for these variables in our regression analysis to allow for the possibility that they might also influence the ownership structure and analyst coverage. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for the regressions of environmental performance and the breadth of ownership. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and to clustering within firm over time. In these regressions, we account for several factors that may affect the breadth of ownership. For instance, larger and older firms are more likely to attract the attention of a larger number of investors.
B. Environmental Performance and the Breadth of Ownership
Thus, we include the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Market Value) to control for the effect of firm size. 10 As older firms have established track records, they are less prone to risk and therefore, may attract a larger number of investors.
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Additionally, firms listed in the S&P500 are more visible to investors and may have a large number of investors as in Merton (1987) . Therefore, we add a S&P500 dummy in our analysis. We use a Nasdaq dummy to control for differences across stock exchanges.
We also control for corporate governance measures which potentially affect the breadth of ownership and environmental performance. Therefore, we include a CEO/Chairman duality dummy, the GIM index and Independent Board dummy in the regressions. As market based measures are correlated, we successively add Tobin's Q, stock return, standard deviation of stock return, turnover and the inverse of stock price in the regression. Finally, we run a regression that includes all these variables. As in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we control for (but do not report) 1-digit SIC and year dummies in these regressions.
[Place Table 3 about here]
We find significant effects of environmental performance on the number of shareholders (NS). Specifically, green and toxic firms have 1,670 and 1,650 more investors on average, respectively, relative to neutral firms (Model 1). These are equivalent to 4.3% and 4.2% increases in NS relative to the sample average. Gray firms also attract a larger number of investors. We continue to find significant effects of green, 10 We also include size and age variables separately, and continue to find similar results. 11 Age may also help establish brand name over years and may enable firms being more visible to investors.
toxic and gray firms when we successively add market-based measures in the regression.
Collectively, these findings are consistent with our previous univariate analysis, and provide strong support for our previous notion that there is a non-monotonic relationship between environmental performance and the breadth of ownership.
Several of our control variables also have explanatory power in the regressions.
Consistent with Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004), we find that older and larger firms attract a larger number of investors. Furthermore, the number of shareholders decreases with turnover, stock price and volatility. Good corporate governance practices (i.e., independent boards and CEO/Chair separation) also improve the breadth of ownership.
In order to capture the effect of environmental performance on institutional investors relative to its effect on individual investors, we conduct similar regressions for both the ratio of the number of institutional investors to the total number of shareholders, and the ratio of shares held by institutions to the total shares outstanding. Models 7-12 in Table 3 report the regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of number of institutional investors to NS. Regardless of the model specification, we observe decreases in the ratio of institutional investors that are statistically significant at the 1% level when firms are classified as green, toxic or gray. Table 4 reports regressions of institutional holdings. The dependent variable in models 1-6 is the ratio of shares held by all institutional investors to total shares outstanding. The effects of green, toxic and gray firms on total institutional holdings are negative and significant. They are also economically significant. Specifically, Model 6 documents that the share of institutional holdings in the green, toxic and gray firms decrease by 2.8%, 2.8% and 3.0%, respectively. Since the average institutional holding percentage in our sample is 72%, these decreases correspond to reductions in the magnitudes of 3.9%, 3.9% and 4.2% for a representative firm in our sample.
[Place Table 4 about here]
We also observe that institutional holdings increase with turnover and stock price, which is consistent with the findings of Gompers and Metrick (2001) . Furthermore, firms listed on the S&P 500 index and firms that have higher average monthly stock returns also have larger relative institutional holdings. While firms with independent boards also attract larger institutional holdings (albeit statistically significant only at the 10% level), institutional holdings are unrelated to the GIM index or CEO/Chairman duality.
We also study the holdings of institutions differentiated by their various types. 13-F filings report five institutional investor types: banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors (e.g., hedge funds) and others (e.g., universities, pension plans and employee ownership plans). As the classification scheme for institution types changed after 1997, we separately report institutional holdings by various types for 1997 and 1998-2007 in Panels A and B of [Place Table 5 about here]
We also document the variation of institutional holdings across the different institutional types for green and toxic industries. While only banks have significantly lower holdings of firms in green industries, only other institutions have significantly lower holdings of firms in toxic industries. These results indicate considerable variation in the preference for environmental performance across the different institution types. Table 6 presents results from the regressions relating analyst coverage to environmental performance. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering the underlying stock in models 1-6 and the dummy variable for analyst coverage in models 7-12. We use OLS for the former dependent variable and employ probit analysis for the latter. As coefficient estimates are hard to interpret in probit models, we report marginal effects in models 6-12. We do not find a significant effect of green firms on the number of analysts. In contrast, 4 out of our 6 models report a significant positive effect for toxic firms, suggesting that analyst coverage is higher for toxic firms. Furthermore, gray firms also have a significantly larger number of analysts covering their stocks. Specifically, the estimate for the gray firm dummy in model 6 is 0.304, which is equivalent to a 4% increase relative to a representative firm in our sample. Model 7 reports significant effects of toxic and gray firms on the likelihood of analyst coverage (7.1% and 14.5%), whereas the effect of green firms is statistically insignificant. The significant effects of toxic and gray firms correspond to 9% and 18% increases, respectively, relative to a representative firm in the sample.
C. Environmental Performance and Analyst Coverage
[Place Table 6 about here]
It is important to emphasize that the above results are obtained after controlling for other factors that are known to drive analyst coverage. Analyst coverage is significantly and positively related to firm size, age and S&P 500 index membership. We also find that firms with independent boards have a higher likelihood of analyst coverage and that firms with a higher GIM index receive more analyst coverage. The relationships we document between environmental performance and analyst coverage persist after these controls.
D. The effect of industry environmental performance on analyst coverage, and breadth and depth of ownership
In this section, we examine whether environmental performance of an industry affects the variables of interest and whether the industry effect moderates the relationship between firm environmental performance and these variables. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) document that institutional investors and analysts shy away from sin stocks. As
Hong and Kacperczyk classify sin stocks based on the firm's (or one of the segment's) industry grouping, they suggest that industry environmental performance plays an important role in investment choices and analyst coverage.
Our findings are reported in Table 7 . In order to disentangle the effects of firm and industry, we include green and toxic industry variables in basic regressions in oddnumbered models. We continue to find that firm environmental performance measures (i.e., green, toxic and gray) continue to be significant while the effects of green and toxic industry dummies are insignificant. These findings indicate that within industry variation is an important determinant of analyst coverage and ownership structure.
[Place Table 7 about here]
Next, we examine the effects of interaction terms of firm and industry environmental performance measures in even-numbered models. We find a significant moderation effect of toxic industries on toxic firms in ownership regressions.
Specifically, the absolute effects of toxic firms on NS, ratio of institutional investors and institutional holdings is lower in toxic industries. Furthermore, institutional investors hold an additional 7.5% of toxic firm stocks when they are grouped in green industries (model 6). Green firms in green industries also have higher institutional holdings. It is important to note that industry environmental performance does not alter the effect of gray firms on the variables of interest. This suggests a robust effect of gray firms across industries. In addition, the moderating effect of industries does not transcend to analyst coverage, suggesting that analysts focus on firm environmental performance without regard to industry when they select stocks to follow.
E. Environmental performance and stock market valuation
In previous sections, we document that environmental performance has economically meaningful effects on investor holdings and analyst coverage. In this section, we will examine whether such effects also impact stock market valuations, specifically Tobin's Q and portfolio returns. [Place Table 8 about here]
Our findings for the control variables are consistent with previous studies. Firms with larger investments in R&D and higher profitability have higher values of Tobin's Q.
Firms listed in the S&P 500 index also have higher Tobin's Q's. Furthermore, the GIM Index is negatively associated with Tobin's Q (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. (2003)).
Next, we examine portfolio returns in the whole sample as well as in sub-samples of green and toxic industries. Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we construct equally-weighted monthly portfolios for green, toxic and neutral firms over 36 months.
We regress the returns of these portfolios minus the benchmark portfolio returns on four factors from the Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) models. The intercept terms of the regressions of the net returns on the four factors indicate abnormal returns and are reported in Table 9 .
[Place Table 9 about here] Abnormal returns to green and toxic firms relative to neutral firms are negative, but lack statistical significance. Furthermore, abnormal returns to green firms relative to toxic firms are positive and insignificant. These indicate that lower values of Tobin's Q reported for green and toxic firms do not change over time and remain low for both green and toxic firms. We fail to find significant abnormal returns to firms in green and toxic industries.
Finally, we examine portfolio returns in the sub-samples of green and toxic industries. In the sub-sample of green industries, there remains no difference between green and neutral firms, while toxic firms generate negative returns relative to neutral firms. We find a significant difference in abnormal returns between green and toxic firms. In the sub-sample of toxic industries, we find insignificant abnormal returns to green and toxic firms. Collectively, these findings suggest that the lower stock market valuations for green and toxic firms reported in Table 8 persist over time.
III. Conclusions
We examine how the ownership, analyst coverage and stock market valuation of a sample of U.S. firms vary with their environmental performance. Green firms have a larger number of shareholders, which is consistent with the prediction of Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) . Surprisingly, though, green firms have a smaller percentage of institutional owners and ownership stakes, suggesting that while environmental performance makes firms more attractive to individual investors, greenness has the opposite effect on institutional investors.
However, like for green firms, we find that toxic firms and gray firms also have a larger number of shareholders relative to neutral firms while having a smaller percentage of institutional investors and lower institutional ownership stakes. This finding suggests that the relation between ownership structure and environmental performance is nonmonotonic, with total and individual (institutional) ownership being higher (lower) at both ends of the environmental performance spectrum. And while there are significant size and age differences across the four broad environmental classifications we use in our analysis, the ownership differences persist when we control for size and age differences in our regression analysis. When we directly compare our green firm sub-sample with our toxic firm sub-sample, we find that green firms have lower institutional ownership (higher individual ownership) than toxic firms.
Consistent with our results for aggregate institutional ownership, we find smaller ratios of institutional investors in green, toxic and gray firms for all five institutional investor types All institutional types except other institutions (including universities, pension plans and employee ownership plans) hold significantly smaller fractions of the shares of green firms. In contrast, only other institutions hold a significantly lower percentage of shares of toxic and gray firms.
While we find no significant difference in analyst coverage for green firms in our regression analysis, we find that analyst coverage is significantly higher for toxic firms and gray firms, after controlling for size and age differences, and S&P 500 membership.
We also find that both green and toxic firms are valued lower by the market than neutral firms, with Tobin's Q being lower by 5% and 8%, respectively, compared to neutral firms. While abnormal market-adjusted returns to both green and toxic firms relative to neutral firms are negative but statistically insignificant, we find that toxic firms in green industries significantly underperform both green and neutral firms, while there is not statistically significant difference in performance between green and neutral firms.
However, our finding that institutional investors prefer toxic stocks to green stocks is quite surprising, especially in the context of the evidence provided by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) that institutions shun sin stocks. Our study has only scratched the surface of this issue; much more research is needed to understand both the similarities and the differences in the ownership patterns of green and toxic firms and the dichotomous behavior of institutional and individual investors when it comes to the way they perceive corporate environmental performance.
Our study provides a mixed message for firms that may be seeking to improve their environmental performance. On the one hand, greener firms can expect to reap the benefits of a larger investor base despite some evidence that they have may have lower analyst coverage relative to toxic firms. On the other hand, the decline in institutional investment has the potential to reduce monitoring benefits for firms. Our findings suggest that all else equal, firms that place a lower value on institutional investment will be more likely to improve their environmental performance.
Our study provides a much-needed corporate perspective on the topic of investment in environmental performance to complement the growing literature on socially responsible investment. Our findings provide several new insights and point to a fruitful new line of research that is likely to grow in importance as environmental performance takes a more central place in the way firms run their business and investors perceive them.
DATA APPENDIX (in alphabetical order)
Advisors refers to institutional investor type 4 in the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Age refers to the number of years between the year of estimation and the year in which the firm is first listed in CRSP dataset.
Alpha is the intercept of monthly return on the portfolio less the one-month Treasury bill rate on Fama-French three-factors plus momentum factor.
Analyst Coverage takes value one if the firm is covered by an analyst in the I/B/E/S dataset.
Average Inst. Investor Holdings is the ratio of Fraction of Shares Held by Inst. Investors to the Number of Institutional Investors.
Average Monthly Stock Return is the mean monthly holding period return.
Banks refers to institutional investor type 1 in CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Book Debt is the sum of total debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item DLC) and total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item DLTT). CEO/Chairman Dummy takes the value one if CEO is chairman of the board of directors.
Excess Return on Market refers to monthly return on the value-weighted market portfolio of NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stocks less the one-month Treasury bill rate.
Fraction of Shares Held by Inst. Investors is ratio of shares held by institutional investors to shares outstanding.
GIM Index refers to the number of antitakeover provisions reported in IRRC dataset.
Gray Firm Dummy takes the value one if the firm has one or more environmental strengths as well as one or more environmental concerns.
Green Firm Dummy takes the value one if the firm has one or more environmental strengths and has no environmental concerns.
Green Industry Dummy takes value one if 10 percent or more of the industry consists of Green Firms and the percentage of Toxic Firms is less than 10 percent.
High-Minus-Low Return refers to the difference between the returns on portfolios of high-and low Book Equity/Market Equity stocks.
Independent Board Dummy takes value one if the ratio of independent board members is greater than 50 percent.
Insurance refers to institutional investor type 2 in CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Investment refers to institutional investor type 3 in CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Market Value refers market capitalization (shares outstanding (COMPUSTAT item CSHO) times stock price (COMPUSTAT item PRCC_F)).

Market Leverage is Book Debt over Total Assets minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT item CEQ) plus Market Value of equity.
Nasdaq Dummy takes value one if the firm trades at the NASDAQ Stock Exchange.
Neutral Firm takes value one if the firm does not have any environmental strength or concerns.
Neutral Industry takes value one if the industry is not classified as Toxic or Green Industry.
Number of Analysts refer to the number of analysts covering the company.
Number of Environmental
Concerns is the number of environmental concerns reported in the KLD dataset. The concerns indicate if the firm releases hazardous waste, agriculture chemicals and ozone depleting chemicals, has regulatory problems, has substantial emissions and contributes to climate change. If the firm meets the KLD threshold in each area, it is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise.
Strengths is the number of environmental strengths reported in the KLD dataset. The sub-indicators of strengths include the extent to which the firm has environmentally beneficial products and services, uses clean energy, provides open communication about its environmental program and engages in extensive recycling. If the firm meets the KLD threshold in each area, it is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise.
Number of Shareholders (NS) refers to number of shareholders of the company (COMPUSTAT item CSHR).
Other refers to institutional investor type 5 in CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
S&P 500 Dummy takes value one if the firm is listed in the S&P 500 Index.
Small-Minus-Big Return refers to the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks
Std of Daily Stock Return is the standard deviation of daily holding period stock returns.
Tobin's Q is the ratio of Total Assets minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT item CEQ) plus Market Value of equity to Total Assets. Total Assets (TA) is measured as the book value of assets (COMPUSTAT item AT).
Toxic Firm Dummy takes value one if the firm has one or more environmental concerns and has no environmental strengths.
Toxic Industry Dummy takes value one if 10 percent or more of the industry consists of Toxic Firms and the percentage of Green Firms is less than 10 percent.
Turnover is average monthly trading volume over shares outstanding.
1/Stock Price is one over the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. This table reports 
Table1 Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Green Firm 0.513*** 0.536*** 0.510*** 0.516*** 0.492*** 0.441*** -0.473*** -0.498*** -0.474*** -0.479*** -0.446*** -0.405*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Toxic Firm 0.501*** 0.549*** 0.536*** 0.530*** 0.541*** 0.474*** -0.494*** -0.551*** -0.537*** -0.531*** -0.540*** -0.484*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Gray Firm 0.670*** 0.732*** 0.718*** 0.718*** 0.705*** 0.641*** -0.648*** -0.721*** -0.706*** -0.707*** -0.688*** -0.636*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Log (Market Value) 0.597*** 0.558*** 0.550*** 0.634*** 0.564*** 0.666*** -0.195*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.222*** -0.158*** -0.243*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
